Because both Robert Westbrook and Santiago Rey discuss my personal and intellectual relationship with Dick Rorty, I will write a single response to them. I confess that when I first heard (an earlier version) of Westbrook's "A Tale of Two Dicks" at the Toledo conference, it brought tears to my eyes. Dick Rorty had died just a few years earlier (June 8, 2007) and Rob beautifully and perceptively brought Rorty alive. His talk brought back many happy memories of my long and close friendship with Dick. Westbrook's description of Rorty is one of the most judicious, perceptive, and moving portraits that I have read. The Dick Rorty that I knew and with whom I tangled during many years emerges with a rare vividness in his paper. I would also like believe that the flesh and blood Dick Bernstein is really like Westbrook's generous portrait of me. I recall how excited I was when I first read Westbrook's manuscript of his John Dewey and American Democracy. I still think it is the best book written on Dewey. With a sweep and a nuanced sensitivity to the strengths and weaknesses of Dewey, Westbrook describes the Dewey that inspired me. We had lively discussions in the Adirondacks at a memorable conference dedicated to a discussion of Rob's book -a conference organized by Dick Rorty and myself. I think Westbrook is right when he characterizes the clash of temperaments between me and Rorty. Anti-authoritarianism and creative private self-fulfillment play a much greater role in Rorty's thinking than they do in mine. I have always been much more concerned with egalitarianism, dialogue and debate in a democratic community. I share Dewey's conviction that democracy is primarily an individual way of life in a dialogical community. I have a greater (Deweyan) faith in the possibilities of creative participatory democracy than Rorty. And l sought to practice what I learned from Dewey in my participation in the early Civil Rights movement, the anti-Vietnam war movement and my work with the Praxis group of Marxist humanists in the former Yugoslavia. Westbrook -as a first rate intellectual historian-seeks to find the roots for the different temperaments and emphases in my thinking and Rorty's. I find his account of Rorty early life -growing up in the progressive environment of his parents and grandparents-persuasive. As for myself, I am not in the position to know where my commitment of a Deweyean version of radical democracy came from. But I do know that long before I read Dewey -when I was still a teenager-I felt a strong identification with the current in the American democratic tradition epitomized by Dewey (which I only later discovered could be traced back to Jefferson, Paine, Emerson, and Whitman). I don't know to what extent my liberal Jewish background contributed to my outlook -although I always identified myself as a Jew and was proud of my heritage. I also spent two years (1957-58 and 1965-66) teaching at the Hebrew University. Israel in those days was a very different community than it is today -filled with moral optimism and hope. Santiago Rey's paper complements Westbrooks historical perspective. He gives an excellent account of Peirce's pragmatic fallibilism and shows why fallibilism is not simply a form of skepticism. He also shows the truth of Hilary Putnam's remark "that one can be both fallibilistic and antiskeptical is perhaps the unique insight of American pragmatism." He brings out how I conceive fallibilism not merely as an epistemological doctrine but as consisting of a set of ethical practices and virtues that include the ability to listen -really listen-to others. He therefore helps to explain why I have been drawn to the hermeneutical tradition -and especially to the central role that to-and-fro conversation and dialogue play in the work of Gadamer. Despite Rorty's emphasis on the "conversation of the West" he seems to be primarily concerned with the conversation among intellectuals. I don't think that Rorty has much feel for actual public conversation among ordinary people or for the need to create public spaces in which citizens can argue and debate with each other. Sometimes Rorty writes as if the key political question is what you would do if you were president of the United States rather than what citizens should do to take responsibility for their political communities.
Rey also presses the difference between the pragmatic fallibilist and the liberal ironist. One of the most misleading distinctions that Rorty proposes is the sharp distinction between argument and redescription -a distinction that is fundamental for the project of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Rorty's understanding of argument is a caricature of the role that argument really plays in philosophy. It is rarely (if ever) that genuine arguments in philosophy -or in other areas of human life-are simply determined by explicit rules or algorithms. If they were, then computers could determine whether an argument is valid. And redescription in philosophy is never "merely" redescription, but involves argument. There is far more entanglement of redescription and argument than Rorty acknowledges. I completely agree with Rey when he writes: "A world inhabited by Rortian ironists would be a messy place; a cacophony of voices talking past each other in a chaotic space of blooming vocabularies and redescriptions of the world where what ultimately matters is not who has the better argument, but who is loud enough to silence everyone else." But one can give a more sympathetic "reasonable account" (a phrase that Rorty would reject) of the ironist if one acknowledges that there are better and worse descriptions and better and worse reasons in playing off vocabularies against each other. To admit that there are better and worse
